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Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top
F.H. Buckleyt and Margaret F. Bririgi
Strong arguments may be made for the devolution of wel-
fare responsibilities to the states. Given state misincentives,
however, the federal government might reasonably prescribe
spending ceilings, to prevent state overspending on welfare.
Arguments for federally-prescribed minimum payouts are
less persuasive. The most promising such argument claims
that, absent a federal floor, states will cut benefits in a race
to the bottom to prevent becoming a magnet for welfare-
seeking migrants. This article's econometric study of the
determinants of AFDC payouts finds no evidence that states
react in this way. In any event, such problems might less
intrusively be addressed through two-tier residency require-
ments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the next few years, the Supreme Court will likely be asked
to review the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 (PRA),1 as well as
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1 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PL
104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (PRA).
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the new generation of state welfare laws passed in the wake of fed-
eral welfare reform. In particular, the Court will likely be asked to
pass on two-tier state residency requirements. Under two-tier
requirements, states offer recent arrivals from lower payout states
the benefits they would have received in their exit state. The exist-
ing case law leaves room for such plans to be upheld, and this arti-
cle argues that state discrimination amongst welfare recipients
through two-tier plans reasonably promotes the experimentation
needed to reform a flawed welfare system. However, we also argue
that the PRA's restrictions on excessive state payouts reasonably
respond to an incentive problem inherent in federally-financed
plans.
This article asks how welfare responsibilities should be assigned
in a federal state. In the United States, the division of power over
welfare between federal and state governments has become increas-
ingly controversial. A recent Supreme Court decision did not
resolve these issues, but instead invited fresh litigation.' Substan-
tial questions remain after the overhaul of federal welfare policies
in the PRA. The PRA gives the states greater latitude in shaping
welfare policies, but the constitutional basis for the delegation of
power is not always clear. The PRA also imposes new fetters on the
states, designed to curb excessively generous programs. Yet shortly
before signing the bill, President Clinton waived compliance for
the very generous District of Columbia program.3 Thus the debate
over the assignment of welfare responsibilities is likely to con-
tinue.
Many of the standard arguments for assigning powers to the
state level apply in the case of welfare responsibilities. Devolution
of welfare powers usefully reduces information costs, promotes
experimentation, and permits people to sort themselves out by pol-
icy preferences through migration. However, two arguments might
be made for retaining a federal role in welfare policy.
First, devolution might result in excessive welfare payouts when
the federal government subsidizes state plans through matching
grants, as it did from the Great Depression to 1996. Where the
2 Anderson v Green, 115 S Ct 1059, 1061 (1995) (vacating the judgments of the
courts below and ordering the case dismissed in order to "clea[r] the path for future
relitigation of the issues between parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of
which was prevented through happenstance" (citation omitted)).
' Naomi Lopez and Michael Tanner, Welfare Reform Bypass for D.C., Washing-
ton Times A18 (Sept 16, 1996) ("Lopez & Tanner, Welfare Reform Bypass"); Judith
Havemann, District Could Become Welfare Oasis as Neighbors' Benefits Dry Up,
Washington Post A13 (Sept 15, 1996) ("Havemann, Welfare Oasis"). The waiver was
subsequently revoked, ostensibly for technical reasons.
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costs of a program are shared in this way with out-of-state taxpay-
ers, states may have an incentive to overspend on in-state welfare
recipients. Even under block grant financing,4 states may over-
spend on welfare programs which subsidize deviant behavior and
whose effects are felt out-of-state. If the federal subsidy is to be
maintained, these adverse incentive problems argue for federal
curbs on excessive payouts of the kinds proposed in the 1994 Con-
tract With America s and enacted in the PRA.
If devolution might result in excessive payouts under adverse
incentive theories, it has the opposite effect under race to the
bottom theories. Since the PRA permits states to impose new eli-
gibility requirements on welfare applicants, it may lead to
increased differences in welfare availability amongst the states.
More liberal states, with less exacting eligibility requirements,
may then attract welfare migrants from more conservative states.
This will swell recipient caseloads in the liberal states, and the
added financial burden on in-state taxpayers may pressure such
states to tighten their eligibility requirements. Less liberal states
may follow suit, lest they in turn become welfare magnets.
The result is said to be a general movement to tighter eligibil-
ity requirements and lower payouts, a prospect some will find
troubling.
There are, however, three reasons why race to the bottom the-
ories might fail to persuade. First, welfare opponents will applaud
any tightening of welfare eligibility requirements, and regard such
a competition as a race to the top. Second, any pressure to cut
benefits might be thought a useful counterbalance to the incen-
tive to overspend on welfare spending identified by adverse incen-
tive theories. Third, vote-seeking theories suggest that some states
will offer a premium welfare payout to attract welfare migrants. A
pro-welfare political party in a state may prize welfare migrants
for their political support in elections. When such parties domi-
nate state politics, the state might maintain a high payout, or
even increase it, in a competition with other states for welfare
migrants.
' Under block grant financing, the federal government contributes 100% of the
state welfare budget up to a floor amount, with states contributing 100% of the cost
above this Under matching grants, the federal government contributes a fixed per-
centage of the state welfare budget, without a ceiling.
' Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds, Contract With America 67 (Random
House, 1994). The Contract with America was a series of legislative proposals that
a large number of Republican congressional candidates promised to bring to a vote
in the event that the House of Representatives fell under Republican control after
the 1994 elections.
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This article tests race to the bottom and vote-seeking theories
through an econometric study of the determinants of payouts
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram from 1980-1991. AFDC is in many ways the flagship of the
US welfare system.6 Had there been a race to the bottom, states
would have reacted to increased welfare pressure with welfare cuts.
We find no evidence that this happened. Instead, welfare pressure
is correlated with increased welfare payouts. This result is consis-
tent with vote-seeking explanations, but not with race to the bot-
tom theories.
Part II reviews how the responsibility for setting AFDC policies
has been divided between state and federal governments. Parts III
and IV then consider arguments for and against assigning welfare
responsibilities to the states. Part V reports on an empirical test of
the determinants of payout policies, and Part VI concludes with a
recommendation that welfare powers be shared between the two
levels of government.
II. THE ASSIGNMENT OF WELFARE
RESPONSIBILITIES IN A FEDERAL STATE
In a federal system, the financing and design of welfare programs
might be assigned to either level of government. On the financing
side, welfare programs might be paid for entirely by the federal gov-
ernment or entirely by state governments, or through revenue-
sharing schemes to which both levels of government contribute.
On the design side, the states might set payouts and eligibility
requirements; alternatively, the federal government might dictate
design policies, either through its own programs (such as Social
Security) or through subsidies to state programs (such as AFDC)
where the grants are conditioned on acceptance of federal man-
dates.
Before the New Deal, states were solely responsible for financing
and designing welfare programs. During the Great Depression, how-
ever, many states faced sharp declines in revenues and increases
6 AFDC is not the only federal welfare program. Other programs include Medic-
aid, Food Stamps, and Housing Allowances. But at $22 billion per year, AFDC is the
second largest program, after Medicaid. Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1994 384 (Bureau of the Census) (1992 figures). Moreover, AFDC recipients are
almost automatically eligible for Food Stamps and Medicaid. As such, "AFDC is in
many ways the key to the welfare system for the single parent." Stuart Butler and
Anna Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap: A Conservative Strategy for Welfare
Reform 138 (Free Press, 1987) ("Butler & Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap").
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in welfare demands, and the federal government began to finance
national and state welfare programs! Since then, it has generally
been accepted that wealth transfers from rich to poor states are a
proper function of the federal government. Otherwise, have-not
states would be forced to reduce welfare payouts below what are
considered minimal levels.
The federal subsidy for state AFDC programs began in the
L930s- Until passage of the PRA, the federal government con-
tributed matching funds to state AFDC programs. In low-payout
states, the federal subsidy was 80% of the program's cost; in
higher-payout states, the subsidy was 50%.' After 1996, however,
the PRA replaced matching grants with block grant financing.
9
Under block grants, the federal government contributes 100% of
the cost of a plan below a floor amount, and nothing above that.
For the AFDC program (renamed Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families or "TANF" by the PRA), the floor is set by recent state
payout levels, with built-in increases for population growth in low
payout states.
Federal subsidies, whether through matching or block grants,
often come with strings, and the AFDC/TANF program is no
exception. Before the PRA, federal fetters restricted "workfare"
(which requires welfare recipients to seek and accept employ-
ment in some circumstances) and residency requirements, and
were resented by conservative states, which sought waivers from
the federal rules. 10 By contrast, the PRA's restrictions, largely
inspired by the Republican Contract With America, mandate
workfare," place a five-year limit on welfare eligibility, 12 and
7 Paul E. Peterson and Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a Fed-
eral Standard 96 (Brookings Institution, 1990) ("Peterson & Rom, Welfare Mag-
nets"). Republicans had opposed the turnover of Social Security to the federal gov-
ernment, on the grounds that it should be directed at the truly needy rather than all
Americans. As such, it was difficult for them to oppose a means-tested program like
AFDC. In addition, some states lacked the funds to finance their own program dur-
ing the Depression.
' On matching and non-matching grants, see Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B.
Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 461-65 (McGraw-Hill, 5th ed.
1989). On variable matching grants, where the grantor's share is higher in poor juris-
dictions, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 93 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1972) ("Oates, Fiscal Federalism").
9 PRA § 403, 110 Stat at 2115.
10 As welfare reform was debated in Congress, the waiting time for a waiver
increased to almost a year. Jonathan Rabinovitz, U.S. Opposing Welfare Rules in
Connecticut, NY Times Al (Dec 9, 1995).
n PRA § 402, 110 Stat at 2113.
12 PRA § 408, 110 Stat at 2134.
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prohibit payouts to teenage parents who do not live in an adult-
supervised setting.'" The PRA also places congressional approval
on two-tier plans, in which recent interstate immigrants are
offered lower benefits than long-term residents.14 State plans
must "indicate whether the state intends to treat families mov-
ing into the state from another state differently than other fami-
lies under the program, and if so, how the state intends to treat
such families under the program."' 5 Section 404(c) then provides
that a state "may apply to a family the rules (including benefit
amounts) of the program funded under this part of another state
if the family has moved to the state from the other state and has
resided in the state for less than 12 months."
This delegation of power will likely be subjected to a constitu-
tional challenge. In Shapiro v Thompson,'6 the Supreme Court held
that Connecticut's residency requirements impermissibly fettered
the mobility rights of individuals. The Court noted that there was
"weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor
who need or may need relief was the specific objective of these pro-
visions." 17 The plan struck down in Shapiro, however, is distin-
guishable from the two-tier plans authorized by the PRA, because
Connecticut denied all relief to welfare recipients during the resi-
dency period.'" By contrast, two-tier plans simply reduce benefits
during the qualifying year, and thus do not threaten "the ability of
the families to obtain the very means to subsist."' 9
13 Id.
4 Prior to the PRA, several high payout states sought to adopt two-tier residency
requirements to chill welfare-motivated migrants from low payout states. For exam-
ple, Wisconsin has historically offered a more generous payout than neighboring Illi-
nois, where payouts are about 40% lower. Dirk Johnson, Rethinking Welfare: Inter-
state Migration-A Special Report: Larger Benefits Lure Chicagoans to Wisconsin,
NY Times All (May 8, 1995) ("Johnson, Rethinking Welfare"). See also Peterson &
Rom, Welfare Magnets, at 26-47 (cited in note 7). Because it feared becoming a wel-
fare magnet, Wisconsin sought and obtained a waiver to adopt a two-tier system in
southern Wisconsin. However, the waiver was granted near the end of the Bush
administration, and subsequent requests by other states for a two-tier waiver were
turned down by the Clinton administration.
1s PRA § 402(a)(1[B), 110 Stat at 2113.
16 394 US 618, 628 (1969).
17 Id.
" Similarly, a complete denial of welfare to aliens who are not long-term resi-
dents was struck down under the equal protection clause in Graham v Richardson,
403 US 365, 374-75 (1971). Unlike naturalization laws, which require a "uniform
rule" under US Const, Art I, § 8, ci 4, and federal as opposed to state action, Math-
ews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 84 (1976), block grants to states for public assistance do not
seem to mandate such a unitary approach. On the contrary, one of the purposes of
the Personal Responsibility Act is to promote flexibility and experimentation.
19 394 US at 627. We note that the Supreme Court did not criticize the two-tier
plan in Anderson v Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059 (1995). The plan in that case would
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There is another reason why a new generation of two-tier wel-
fare plans may survive constitutional challenge. So long as they
have a reasonable basis for doing so, states are permitted to dis-
criminate amongst welfare recipients.20 In Dandridge v Williams,21
for example, the Court upheld the Missouri "family cap," in which
families were not permitted to receive more than a stipulated
amount. The desirability of promoting experimentation may then
supply the reasonable basis for residency barriers. While the old
AFDC program was based on an entitlement to public assistance,
the PRA explicitly denies welfare entitlement,22 and promotes
state experimentation to address the problems of poverty. Unless
two-tier plans are permitted, however, states might refuse to exper-
iment lest they attract welfare migrants.
The Supreme Court has upheld residency requirements in other
contexts in order to preserve the integrity of idiosyncratic state
laws. For example, the Court upheld Iowa's one-year residency
requirement for divorce to prevent migrants from making a mock-
ery of the state's liberal divorce laws. 3 A state might "quite rea-
sonably decide that it does not wish to become a divorce mill for
unhappy spouses" from out-of-state.24 The Court could well apply
the same logic to the residency requirements authorized by the
PRA, especially in light of the strong case that can be made for
devolution in terms of constitutional design.
III. THE CASE FOR DEVOLUTION
This Part examines the arguments for assigning welfare responsi-
bilities to state governments in a federal system. Devolution
merely have restricted new arrivals to the payout they had received in their emi-
gration state during a one-year waiting period, in the same manner as contem-
plated by the PRA. Because the federal waiver for the plan had been vacated in a
separate proceeding, however, the Court found that the case was not ripe. See id at
1060. Inasmuch as the Court held that it did not have a justiciable controversy
before it, the absence of comment on the merits of the two-tier plan is probably
insignificant.
20 See Jefferson v Hackney, 406 US 535, 546 (1972) ("So long as its judgments are
rational, and not invidious, the legislatures's efforts to tackle the problems of the
poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.").
21 397 US 471, 485 (1970).
2 See PRA § 401(b): "This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual
or family to assistance under any state program funded under this part."
23 Sosna v Iowa, 419 US 393 (1975).
24 Id at 403.
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(1) avoids the costs of uniform payouts, (2) economizes on infor-
mation costs, (3) promotes experimentation, (4) permits natives
to "vote with their feet" by settling in jurisdictions whose poli-
cies they favor, and (5) weakens the relative power of established
interest groups.
In what follows, we assume that government wealth transfers in
general, and the AFDC program in particular, are a public good.
That is, we assume that states consider welfare recipients deserv-
ing and wish to provide for them, and that private charities are
inadequate to the task. The argument for making this assumption
begins by acknowledging that without public welfare, tax burdens
would be lighter, and taxpayers could contribute more heavily to
private charities. But the taxpayer might prefer to free ride on the
charitable contributions of others, since his contribution will make
little difference to overall poverty levels. He would then give less
to private charity than he might if all parties could bind them-
selves against free riding. In a hypothetical bargain, the covenant
against free riding will take the form of mandatory taxes and pub-
lic welfare programs.
We note, however, that this argument is increasingly controver-
sial. The median voter's desire to fund public wealth transfer pro-
grams might arise entirely from his belief that moneys will be fun-
neled to him.' Conservative critics also suggest that public
welfare programs, so far from being a good, have actually harmed
communities by subsidizing deviant behavior. The AFDC program
is particularly controversial. When the program began in the
1930's, only widowed, divorced and abandoned wives qualified.
Today, however, more than half the recipients have never been
married.2 6 For traditional religious believers, the subsidy for illegit-
" Because the income distribution is skewed, the mean voter's income is higher
than that of the median voter. The latter may therefore support transfer payments
from those with higher incomes. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democ-
racy (Harper & Row, 1957) ("Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy"); Virginia
Gray, Models of Comparative State Politics: A Comparison of Cross-Sectional and
Time Series Analysis, 20 Am J Pol Sc 235 (1976) ("Gray, Models of Comparative
State Politics"); Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the
Size of Government, 89 J Pol Econ 914 (1981) ("Meltzer & Richard, Size of Govern-
ment"). This assumes that the median voter does not seek to expropriate wealth
from both tails of the income distribution, as proposed by Aaron Director. See Gor-
don Tullock, The Charity of the Uncharitable, 9 West Econ J 379 (1971) ("Tullock,
Charity"); George J. Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J L
& Econ 1 (1970) ("Stigler, Director's Law"). For a review of the evidence, see Den-
nis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 452-53 (Cambridge U, 1989) ("Mueller, Public
Choice II").
26 Green Book, Background material and data on programs within the jurisdic-
tion of the Committee on Ways and Means (GPO, 1994).
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imacy 27 is wrong in itself. In addition, there is a good deal of evi-
dence linking illegitimacy with other social pathologies, such as
crime.28 The assumption that free rider problems prevent private
charities from substituting for public welfare has also been chal-
lenged. Private charities were active before the advent of the mod-
ern welfare state. Since they were sponsored by religious groups,
they were also more successful in reforming the recipient.29
We note that the validity of our findings do not depend on
accepting the conservative critique of modem welfare programs.
A. Diverse Local Conditions
The first argument for devolution is not so much for the assign-
ment of welfare powers to the states as it is against uniform
national payouts. The cost of living varies substantially amongst
and within states, and a parsimonious payout in New York City
might be excessive in Idaho. More nuanced programs, such as those
conditioning benefits on skills training or work by the recipient,
will also be sensitive to local conditions. For example, workfare
requirements might make little sense if low-skill jobs are not avail-
able. Optimal welfare policies must also take regional social norms
into account. Where the social stigma of unemployment and ille-
gitimacy is severe, for example, a state may have less to fear from
the perverse incentives of welfare.
3 0
B. Local Informational Advantages
Diverse local conditions are not in themselves an argument for
devolution, as the federal government might in theory set up a sep-
arate program for each state. But it is unlikely that the federal gov-
27 AFDC payouts were found to be positively and significantly correlated with
higher illegitimacy rates in Margaret F. Brinig and RH. Buckley, The Price of Virtue,
Public Choice (forthcoming 1997) ("Brinig & Buckley, Price of Virtue").
' The evidence is reviewed in David Popenoe, Life Without Father 52-78 (Free
Press, 1996) ("Popenoe, Life Without Father").
29 Marvin Olasky, The Tragedy of American Compassion (Regnery Gateway,
1994).
'o Some have argued that American norms are uniform, and that a central gov-
ernment may therefore prescribe national standards. Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L Rev 903, 923
(1994). We believe otherwise, and have found evidence of diverse regional norms in
econometric studies of bankruptcy and divorce. F.H. Buckley and Margaret E Brinig,
The Bankruptcy Puzzle (George Mason University School of Law Working Paper #
95-006, 1995) ("Buckley & Brinig, Bankruptcy Puzzle"); Margaret F. Brinig and F.H.
Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People (George Mason University School of
Law Working Paper # 95-009, 1995) ("Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault Laws").
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ernment could discriminate amongst regions as easily as states
might, because of the local informational advantages enjoyed by
lower levels of government. As the Supreme Court has noted, "a
decentralized government... will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogenous society."3 If the point were simply to
transfer money, the federal government might do the job as well as
the states. But if disincentives to work and incentives to illegiti-
macy are also of interest, we should not expect central welfare
planning to be more successful than central economic planning.
C. Competitive Federalism and the Race for the Top
The third argument for devolution is that it promotes experimen-
tation and the search for optimal welfare policies. The success and
failure of competing plans is more readily tested where states are
permitted to adopt different programs.32 For this reason, competi-
tion among the states in the provision of corporate law is generally
thought to have resulted in a superior law. In a race to the top,
Delaware has emerged as the winner both in quantity and quality.
This would not have happened had a uniform federal law been
imposed on the states.
33
States compete for people as well as for corporations. More than
a century ago, Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis described
a competition for valuable migrants and natives.34 Frontier states
in the West, with fewer geographical advantages, competed for peo-
ple through efficient laws and democratic institutions. Faced with
the loss of valuable natives, Eastern states responded by adopting
similar legal regimes. Like the competition for corporate charters,
then, the competition for migrants described by Turner was also a
race for the top.
'31 Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 458 (1991). See further Albert Breton, The
Economic Theory of Representative Government 114 (MacMillan, 1974); Michael
W. McCormell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484,
1493-94 (1987).
'3 Swift & Go. v United States, 196 US 375, 398 (1905) (Holmes); New State Ice
Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting); Arizona vEvans, 115
S Ct 1185, 1200-01 (1995); United States v Lopez, 115 S Ct 1624, 1640 (1995)
(Kennedy, concurring).
' As was suggested in William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L J 663 (1974). For a review of the evidence that the
competition for state charters is benign, see Roberta Romano, The Genius of Amer-
ican Corporate Law (AEI, 1993).
3 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (U Arizona, 1986).
On the benefits of state competition, see Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US at 457-58.
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States may also compete for residents through their welfare poli-
cies. A wasteful policy may attract deadbeat migrants and prompt
out-migration by valuable natives. This may explain why the
demand for welfare reform came first from state governments
rather than from the federal government. Prior to the PRA, the
most interesting welfare initiatives emerged from the states, and
were blocked through the denial of federal waivers. After the PRA,
state experimentation has accelerated, as states have taken advan-
tage of their new powers to innovate. For example, Florida proposes
to cut payments for additional children born to welfare mothers;
Connecticut and Oregon will subsidize the wages of working wel-
fare recipients; Michigan will sponsor a mentoring program with
ties to a religious group; Kentucky will pay moving expenses for
those wishing to relocate to work; Arkansas might pay a cash
bonus to those who find a job; and Maine will ask caseworkers to
make home visits.3 5 Over time, these initiatives will be tested in
the laboratory of the states.
Even without migration, states may have an incentive to
improve their welfare plans. Where exit options are closed, in-state
residents might voice their dissatisfaction with a failed and costly
welfare system at election time. But the exit (and entry) option of
migration will sharpen the incentives to experiment, and hasten
the race to the top.
This assumes that states can attract or repel migrants through
their internal policies. For some residents, the pecuniary and emo-
tional costs of migration will be too great, and they will stay
put.3 6 However, one can trivialize the costs of not migrating. Peo-
ple move when the costs of remaining in place exceed migration
costs, and this happens often.37 About 40% of Americans do not
reside in their state of birth." Another 8% of Americans are for-
" Dana Milbank, Welfare Overhaul, Shifting Power and Money to the Individ-
ual States, Gets Under Way Today, Wall St J A24 (Oct 1, 1996); Barbara Vobeida and
Judith Havemann, States Take Variety of Paths to Welfare Reform, Wash Post A4
(Oct 6, 1996).
36 James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility:
An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J Pub Econ 25 (1972); Robert P. Inman and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Federalist Fiscal Constitution for an Imperfect World:
Lessons from the United States, in Harry N. Scheiber, ed, Federalism: Studies in
History, Law, and Policy 79, 84-86 (Univ Calif Berkeley Institute of Governmental
Studies, 1988).
37 On welfare migration, see Jon Jeter and Judith Havemann, Rural Poor May
Seek Greener Pastures: Welfare Recipients Face Prospect of Moving Where the Jobs
Are, Wash Post Al (Oct 14, 1996).
38 Kristin A. Hansen, 1990 Selected Place of Birth and Migration Statistics for
States at Table 1 (Bureau of the Census, 1991).
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eign-born.39 State politicians must therefore assume that on aver-
age about half of their residents will be migrants. This proportion
is higher still if one includes the descendants of migrants.
There is some evidence that differential welfare payouts influ-
ence migration flows. In an earlier study, we regressed 1985-1990
migration flows on socio-economic predictors, and found that
higher AFDC payouts are significantly and positively correlated
with in-migration and significantly and negatively correlated with
out-migration.40 Welfare recipients have also been said to respond
quickly to payout cuts. For example, Massachusetts reported an
exodus within months of its 1995 welfare cuts.
4 1
The race for the top theory also assumes, not unreasonably, that
states consider migration flows when fashioning internal policies.
Where half of its residents are up for grabs, states have an enormous
stake in the market for migrants. Differences in wealth in the world,
and within the United States, depend more on people and human cap-
ital than on physical assets and material capital. A state government
that seeks to maximize tax revenues will therefore seek to attract
value-increasing people and repel value-decreasing ones.
D. Diversity and Choice
The fourth argument for devolution is that it permits Americans to
settle in jurisdictions whose policies match their preferences as to
taxes and welfare. Where preferences are idiosyncratic, the diver-
sity of outcomes under devolution provides more choice for Amer-
icans, who can sort themselves among states by voting with their
feet. Where migration is costless and there are no geographic con-
straints on opt-out rights and the number of states which may
emerge, Charles Tiebout has shown that the exit option of migra-
tion results in Pareto-optimal government services.42
39 F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 Int'l Rev L &
Econ 81, 91 (1996) (1990 census) ("Buckley, Immigration Policies").40 Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J Legal Stud
201 (1996) ("Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats").
41 Welfare Exodus, USA Today A3 (Mar 15, 1995). Mayor Giuliani has expressed
the hope that New York City's welfare cuts will persuade some welfare recipients to
move elsewhere. Johnson, Rethinking Welfare (cited in note 14).
4" Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Pol Econ 416
(1956). See also Oates, Fiscal Federalism at 7-8 (cited in note 8); Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 635-49 (Little Brown & Co., 4th ed. 1992); Musgrave &
Musgrave, Public Finance at 455 (cited in note 8); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Fed-
eralism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J Pol Econ 152 (1981);
A.P. Hamlin, The Political Economy of Constitutional Federalism, 46 Public Choice
187 (1985). If the number of states is smaller than the number needed to allow for
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Tiebout's argument for diversity is particularly strong where
government programs, such as AFDC, may have adverse social con-
sequences. Given the AFDC subsidy for illegitimacy, and the link
between illegitimacy and other deviant behavior, 3 there is much
to be said for permitting states to go their own way. Liberals who
object to traditional social values would then be able to settle with
like-minded people, without the fear that conservatives will
impose their values on them, and without imposing their values or,
conservatives.
E. Weakened Interest Group Clout
On interest group theories, it is not surprising that the demand for
welfare reform has come primarily from state governments, rather
than from the federal government. The relative clout of entrenched
interest groups is weaker at the local level, where it is easier to
organize dispersed voters. In contrast, voters are more dispersed at
the federal level, and interest group clout is more likely to be over-
powering.44
This explains why public sector wages are higher in larger juris-
dictions. 45 It also explains why states are more likely to adopt edu-
cational and welfare reform than is the central government.4 6 Lib-
eral interest groups, such as the National Education Association
and the Children's Defense Fund, have considerably more relative
clout at the national than at the state level.
47
IV. THE CASE AGAINST DEVOLUTION
Five arguments may be made for assigning welfare responsibilities
to the federal government. Centralizing welfare powers might be
thought (1) to serve the distributional goal of increasing payouts, or
(2) to promote communitarian sentiments at the national level.
More plausibly, the federal government might be allocated the
power to police excessive state payouts. State payouts might be
apportioning the entire population into homogenous groups, the equilibrium may
be unstable. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Vot-
ing, and the Land Market, 6 J Urban Econ 319 (1979).
43 Brinig & Buckley, Price of Virtue (cited in note 27); Popenoe, Life Without
Father (cited in note 28).
44 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (U Michi-
gan, 1962) ("Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent").
45 Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 21 (Brookings Institution, 1995)
("Peterson, Price of Federalism").
46 Butler & Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap at 89 (cited in note 6).
47 Peterson, Price of Federalism at 36 (cited in note 45).
154 Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top
excessive because (3) they ignore the spillover social costs of their
programs, or because (4) federal matching grants permit states to
export financing costs to other states. Finally, (5) on race to the bot-
tom theories, assigning welfare responsibilities to the federal gov-
ernment might prevent a destructive competition by states to
reduce welfare migration by cutting payouts.
A. Distributional Theories
Many welfare supporters oppose devolution because they believe
that federal payouts are systematically more generous than state
ones. As an empirical matter, this is generally the case. But as an
argument against devolution as matter of constitutional design,
this cannot do. If we all agree as to what the optimal payout should
be, it is irrelevant which level of government is assigned the
responsibility over welfare payouts.
The argument is also dependent on present, contingent political
divisions rather than permanent constitutional principles. Twenty-
five years ago, welfare supporters opposed national standards under
President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan because they thought
that this would reduce payouts in key states.48 With a change in
political advantage, they might support devolution again. Indeed,
today it is the liberal who supports federal waivers from the PRA's
restrictions on lax eligibility standards.
4 9
B. Communitarian Values
Assigning welfare responsibilities to the states might be thought to
weaken social norms, loyalty sentiments and communitarian val-
ues at the national level."0 Where outcomes are equalized by a fed-
eral government, one plausibly feels closer ties to it than to state
governments. This may in part explain why the citizens of this
country are increasingly likely to regard themselves more as Amer-
icans than as residents of a particular state.
The gain in communitarian sentiment at the national level must
nevertheless be balanced against communitarian losses at the state
level. As the closest ties tend to be local, these losses plausibly
exceed the gain. If anything, communitarian ties of any kind were
48 Peterson & Rom, Welfare Magnets (cited in note 7).
49 Lopez & Tanner, Welfare Reform Bypass (cited in note 3); Havemann, Welfare
Oasis (cited in note 3).
'o William A. Schambra, From Self-Interest to Social Obligation: Local Commu-
nities v. The National Community, in Jack A- Meyer, ed., Meeting Human Needs
32, 38 (AEI, 1982).
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generally stronger in the past, when ties to states were stronger.
Centralizing welfare responsibilities in a remote federal govern-
ment might thus have weakened communitarian sentiment, as
well as support for wealth transfer policies.
5 1
C. Exporting Social Costs
State welfare policies may impose external costs on non-state resi-
dents. As these costs are borne by non-voters, state officials can be
expected to ignore or undervalue them. State welfare policies
might thus be inefficient, as compared with welfare policies set by
a broader level of government which better internalizes the exter-
nal costs.5 2
The AFDC subsidy of illegitimacy has been seen as a root cause
of crime and other social pathologies.5 3 These pathologies cross
borders, through migration and crimes committed in border cities.
To the extent that a state ignores the foreign consequences of its
social policies, its AFDC payouts might be too generous or too
readily available. This suggests a justification for federal restric-
tions on excessive payouts, such as those found in the PRA.
D. Adverse Fiscal Incentives
Federal restrictions on state payouts might be justified on a second
adverse incentive theory. Where a welfare program is entirely self-
financed by a state, the state has an incentive to maximize the pro-
gram's total benefits less costs. But where it can export part of the
costs to another state, it may have an incentive to overspend on
the program. 4 For example, prior to the PRA, the federal govern-
ment provided at least 50% of the cost of state AFDC programs,
51 Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Private Good, 2 J Pub Econ
35 (1973); but see Helen F. Ladd and Fred C. Doolittle, Which Level of Government
Should Assist the Poor?, 35 Nat Tax J 323 (1982) (presenting survey findings that
Americans see welfare policies as fulfilling national goals).
52 On standard theories of fiscal federalism, the borders of a state in a federal sys-
tem, and the assignment of jurisdictional responsibilities, should be determined by
the geographic boundaries of public goods and externals costs. Oates, Fiscal Feder-
alism at 11-13 (cited in note 8).
' Brinig & Buckley, Price of Virtue (cited in note 27); Popenoe, Life Without
Father (cited in note 28).
s Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent at 135-40 (cited in note 44). For an
application to state banking regulation, see Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey,
The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988)
(arguing that devolution of banking oversight responsibilities results in an ineffi-
cient race to the bottom because federal deposit insurance permits state banks to
export costs to other states.)
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with no ceiling on payouts. Because 100% of the payouts remained
in the state, while almost half of the costs were exported to other
states, states had an incentive to overspend on AFDC.
These misincentives are addressed in two ways by the PRA.
First, replacing matching with block grants removes the incentive
to overspend above the amount of the federal grant."5 Under block
grants, states bear 100% of the costs of welfare budgets above fed-
eral grants, and the incentive to free ride on out-of-state taxpayers
is eliminated. Second, the PRA mandates strict workfare and eligi-
bility requirements that will reduce the ability of a state to over-
spend on welfare.
5 6
E. The Race for the Bottom
The market for migrants described in Turner's frontier thesis is a
race for the top, with states adopting value-increasing laws to
attract valuable migrants. However, the competition for migrants
may be less benign when states compete for migrants through their
fiscal and welfare policies. Suppose that natives in two adjoining
states have the same mean income, but that one state has a smaller
dispersion of incomes as a consequence of a more generous welfare
system (at the lower end of the distribution) and a more progressive
tax system (at the upper end). We would expect high earners in the
more egalitarian state to emigrate to the other state, and welfare
recipients to migrate in the opposite direction.
7
To avoid becoming a welfare magnet, a state might cut its bene-
fits. Payouts might then be smaller under devolution than they
would be in a unitary state. Or, to put it another way, a welfare-
loving state might be prepared to offer a generous payout to its own
natives, but may not wish to support the higher financial burden
associated with payouts to recent arrivals from other states. If pre-
vented from differentiating between these two classes of potential
recipients, however, the state may simply reduce payout levels and
tax rates. When high-payout states do so, less generous states may
follow, lest they ascend to the head of the queue.5 8
Whether this amounts to an argument against devolution is very
much an open question. Welfare supporters will regard a competi-
55 PRA §403, 110 Stat 2115.
56 PRA §402, 110 Stat 2113; PRA §408, 110 Stat 2134.
57 Buckley, Immigration Policies, 16 Int'l Rev L & Econ 81 (cited in note 39).
58 Jerry L. Mashaw and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in
George C. Eads and Michael Fix, eds, The Reagan Regulatory Strategy: An Assess-
ment 111 (Urban Institute Press, 1984) (suggesting that competition among states
discourages social welfare programs that increase costs to firms).
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tion to reduce payouts as distributionally troubling.5 9 In addition,
welfare migration gives rise to wasteful moving costs which would
be eliminated through uniform national payouts. But the gains
from eliminating migration costs might well be exceeded by the
loses of inefficient decisions not to migrate. Uniform programs
raise the payouts and subsidize residence in economically depressed
states. For example, Canada's costly equalization programs have
been criticized for reducing have-not provinces to a state of depen-
dency.6" As for distributional concerns, AFDC cuts will be
applauded by conservatives, who object to the subsidy for illegiti-
macy. Competitive pressures to cut welfare might also be thought
a useful counterweight to the adverse incentives to adopt excessive
payouts noted in Part III above.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that competitive pressures
under devolution will lead states to cut welfare benefits. Claims
that the only possible equilibrium in the competition for migrants
arises after a race for the bottom rest on unstated assumptions
about what motivates states. On other assumptions, which are not
implausible, state payouts will converge to the mean, not the bot-
tom.
Convergence will be to the mean when states have preferences
as to the size of the welfare budget, but not as to the identity of
the recipients or the per capita payout. Suppose that states first
forecast the total cost of welfare programs, and then determine
payout levels by dividing this amount by the number of antici-
pated recipients.61 Assume that contiguous States A and B have
total fixed welfare budgets of $WA and $WB, to be distributed to
RA and RBo recipients, respectively. All welfare recipients are
mobile, and moving costs are trivial. Where the per-recipient pay-
out is higher in State B, welfare recipients will migrate there from
State A so long as:
WAA(RA0 - M) > WB/(RB-+ M)(1
where M is the number of welfare recipients who migrate from
State A to State B. As the migration continues, the per recipient
payout in State B will fall (since RB0 + M is increasing), while the
59 Peterson & Rom, Welfare Magnets (cited in note 7).
60 Thomas J. Courchene, Avenues of Adjustment: The Transfer System and
Regional Disparities, in Michael Walker, ed, Canadian Confederation at the Cross-
roads 145 (Frasier Institute, 1978).
61 Which they may do even if, as a matter of form, they are asked first to calcu-
late a recipient "needs standard." Peterson & Rom, Welfare Magnets at 7 (cited in
note 7). Given rational expectations, states will set per capita payout levels with an
eye on total welfare budgets.
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per recipient payout in State A will increase (since RAo - M is
falling). The migration will stop only when payouts equalize and
the incentive to move disappears:
WJ(RAO- M) = WB/(RBo + M). (2)
Suppose, for example, that State A's welfare budget WA is
$10,000, which it proposes to pay out entirely to its 100 recipients
RAo. Absent migration, each recipient would therefore expect to be
paid $100. State B has a like number of welfare recipients RBO, but
a welfare budget WB of $12,000. Without migration, the payout to
State B welfare recipients will be $120. Given this differential,
State A recipients will migrate to State B until per capita payouts
are equalized. This will happen when 9 migrants have moved from
State A to State B, and per-recipient payouts are approximately
$110 in each state. At that point, welfare migration will stop, since
State B payouts would fall to $109.09 and State A payouts will
increase to $111.11 with the tenth migrant.
Welfare migration will therefore result in a decline in the per-
recipient payout in the more generous state. This is not a race to
the bottom, however, as payouts in the less generous state will
have increased. In addition, payout cuts may be smaller as a conse-
quence of welfare migration. Suppose that State B reduces its wel-
fare budget to $9,000, while State A maintains its $10,000 budget.
State B payouts will initially fall to $90, while those in State A will
remain at $100. The difference in payouts will attract welfare
migrants from State A to State B, and payouts will equalize at $95
per capita. Migration will benefit both the recipients who move
from and those who remain in the low payout state.
Next, we relax the assumption that states are indifferent as
between natives and migrants. Suppose that State B cares less for
new arrivals and anticipates welfare migration. It might then cut
its welfare budget by $D. Adjusting equation (2):
WAJ(RA - M) = (WB - D)/(RBo + M). (3)
Where D is $500, and the other numbers are unchanged, the per-
recipient payout in both states will converge to $107.50.62 Thus the
result is not a race to the bottom, but convergence around a dis-
counted mean. The size of the discount will depend on the level of
migration flows.
6' We assume that preferences as to natives are asymmetrical, and that State B's
desire to repel welfare migrants is stronger than State A's desire to retain them.
Otherwise State A would increase its payouts to prevent out-migration by welfare
recipients.
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A race to the bottom may, however, obtain where low-payout
states adopt a policy of keeping per-recipient payouts constant. For
example, State A might consider that its initial payout was fair,
and that out-migration permits it to economize on welfare and
spend money for other purposes. State A will then maintain a con-
stant per-recipient payout of WA/RA., while State B will continue to
provide (WB - D)/(RBo + M), so long as this exceeds WA/RA0. 6  With
a relatively large number of State A recipients, convergence will be
at its payout of $100 per recipient, with 15 welfare recipients
migrating from State A to State B. The State B welfare budget will
remain at (WB - D) = $11,500, while that of State A will fall to
[(WARA0)(RA - M)] = $8,500.
There is another reason why convergence might be to the lowest
payout. If welfare seekers can migrate, so too can the wealthy. With
lower payouts comes a lower tax burden, disproportionately bene-
fiting high earners in a progressive tax regime. The high payout
state might then see its tax base erode when high earners leave the
state. Wealthy citizens might simply see redistribution schemes as
a taking, and migrate to low tax states. To the extent that this per-
mits voters to sort themselves out by their policy preferences, it is
a useful example of voting with one's feet. But the wealthy might
leave a high payout state even if they feel empathy for welfare
recipients. While the high earner might prefer to see adequate pro-
vision made for welfare recipients, his own defection will by itself
have little effect or no effect on total welfare budgets. He can there-
fore free ride on the wealthy natives he leaves behind them.64 But
there will be fewer of these after the mobile wealthy have
migrated, and the state might respond by cutting welfare benefits.
Changes in patterns of payouts offer weak support at best for
race to the bottom theories. As seen in Figure 1, real average AFDC
payouts rose over the period 1951-1970, then fell in the 1970s, and
remained relatively stationary in the 1980s. Unless welfare migra-
tion was restricted to one decade only,6" there is little to suggest
that states feared becoming welfare magnets. A more serious diffi-
63 The State B per capita payout will never fall below the initial State A per
capita payout, since the incentive to migrate would then disappear.
4 Albert Breton and Anthony Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal
States 127 (U Toronto, 1978).
65 Migration by the poor is not a new phenomenon. One of the most important
demographic shifts in American history was the Great Migration of Blacks north-
wards between the two world wars. On the other hand, residency requirements were
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1969, so welfare recipients may
plausibly be thought to have become more mobile in the 1970s. Peterson & Rom,
Welfare Magnets at 17 (cited in note 7).
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Figure 1. Mean AFDC Payments
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culty is that real average payouts did not converge, but instead
became more dispersed. The coefficient of variation (the annual
standard deviation divided by the mean) increased, as may be seen
in the following OLS regression on the time trend.
Coefficient of Variation = 0.299 (55.6) + 0.00187 Year (8.16)
R2 (adj.) = 62.7%. T-statistics in parenthesis. Number = 40.
As seen in Figure 2, moreover, the increase in dispersion is fairly
constant throughout the forty-year period. Remarkably, increases in
federal matching grants to low-payout states during the period were
not associated with reductions in the variance of benefits levels.
66
The following Part of this article suggests several explanations
why payout differentials persisted, and tests them in an economet-
ric study of the determinants of AFDC payouts.
V. AN EMPIRICAL TEST
The previous two Parts examined arguments for and against devo-
lution. The arguments for devolution made a presumptive case for
turning control over welfare policies to the states. The arguments
66 Robert A. Moffitt, The Effects of Grants-in-Aid on State and Local Expendi-
tures: The Case of AFDC, 23 J Pol Econ 288 (1984).
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Figure 2. AFDC Coefficient of Variation
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against devolution might justify federal restrictions on excessive
state payouts, such as those proposed in the Contract with Amer-
ica and enacted in the PRA, because of a concern with adverse
incentives. Federal restrictions on inadequate state payouts are
harder to justify. The most prominent argument for federally-man-
dated floors is the race to the bottom theory, according to which
states will compete to lower their payouts lest they attract welfare-
seeking migrants. This Part tests this and other explanations for
the variance in state AFDC payouts.
A. The Persistence of Payout Differentials
The previous Part noted that race to the bottom theories predict that
state welfare payouts will converge over time, and that AFDC pay-
outs have failed to do so. There are three possible explanations for
this.
The first is that welfare migrants might have been too few in
number to make any practical difference. Even with differential
payouts, the material and emotional costs of moving might keep
most recipients in low payout states from migrating to high payout
states. Because welfare recipients have no incentive to move when
the costs of migration (C) exceed the benefits of a higher payout,
payouts will never converge to the same level.
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Figure 3. Mean AFDC Payments, 1980-91
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WA/(RA - M) = [(WB - D)/(RBo + M)] - C. (4)
However, it is unlikely that moving costs alone explain the per-
sistence of payout differentials. Moving costs have likely declined
over time, but payout disparities are long-standing, and even
increased between 1951 and 1990. Moreover, moving costs cannot
explain regional patterns in payouts, as seen in Figure 3. Moving
costs do not differ much amongst regions, and yet regional payout
disparities are striking. In addition, many migrants will find that
moving costs are trivial. If one has to move in any event, trans-
portation costs might not be much greater for an out-of-state than
for an in-state move. As for the emotional costs of moving, these
are sometimes exceeded by the emotional costs of staying put, and
the sentimental value of remaining in a crime-ridden inner city
might be small. Finally, there is reason to think that welfare migra-
tion is not trivial in size. Many Americans move, the poor are more
mobile than the non-poor,6 7 and higher welfare payouts appear to
attract migrants.
68
67 Peterson & Rom, Welfare Magnets at 16-17 (cited in note 7).
68 Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats (cited in note 40).
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The second reason why payout disparities might have persisted
is because of long-term regional differences in economic conditions
and attitudes toward welfare. Poorer states might simply be unable
to afford the more generous payouts of wealthier states.69 In that
case, however, one might have expected that differential federal
subsidies would have resulted in a greater convergence. Before the
PRA, the federal matching grant was 80% for low-payout programs,
and only 50% for high payout ones.
The third reason why payouts might not have converged is
because, on vote-seeking theories, state political parties have an
incentive to promote in-migration by their supporters and out-
migration by their opponents. Welfare recipients cast votes,70 and a
pro-welfare political party might want its state to be thought a wel-
fare magnet. The prospect of out-migration by welfare-haters might
also appeal. Other states, dominated by other political parties,
might seek to attract the welfare-haters, and to induce native wel-
fare-lovers to leave. The two states will then trade off voters like
the Spratt family at table. Neither state will adopt the same wel-
fare policies they would in a world of closed borders.71
It is reasonable to suppose that welfare payouts are set in part
with an eye to migrant votes. If politicians find it useful to compete
for votes through the promise about welfare levels, and differential
welfare payouts prompt migration, they might find little reason to
prefer native to migrant votes. Federal immigration policies are in
fact shaped in part by the competition for immigrant votes,7 2 even
though non-citizens are not permitted to vote until naturalization.
Vote-seeking theories may be seen as a simple application of the
median voter theorem, in which all voters with incomes below the
median support redistribution to themselves.7 3 In another respect,
however, the two theories differ. On median voter theories, a party's
policies are seen as fluid, and the sentiments of the median voter as
69 In addition, regional differences in the cost of living likely explain part of the
variance in payouts. However, Peterson and Rom report that the variance in welfare
payouts is far greater than the variance n cost of living figures. Peterson & Rom,
Welfare Magnets at 11 (cited in note 7).
70 Even if not so frequently as better-off voters. However, this simply means
that the voting strength of a block of welfare recipients must be discounted. It
does not mean that a political party cannot rationally court welfare supporters.
71 Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats (cited in note 40). Of course, one does not expect
politicians to announce plans to swap a set of natives for a set of migrants.
72 Buckley, Immigration Policies, 16 Int'l Rev L & Econ 81 (cited in
note 39).
7' Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy (cited in note 25); Gray, Models of
Comparative State Politics (cited in note 25); Meltzer & Richard, Size of Govern-
ment (cited in note 25); Tullock, Charity (cited in note 25); Stigler, Director's Law
(cited in note 25); Mueller, Public Choice II (cited in note 25). The votes of welfare
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fixed. But this is reversed on vote-seeking theories, which see policies
as fixed and voters as fluid. Thus, an unpopular political party might
either trim its policies on median voter theories, or elect a new elec-
torate on vote-seeking theories.
B. Prior Studies
Prior empirical research supports an economic explanation for dif-
ferences in payout policies. More prosperous states, with a stronger
tax base, are found to offer higher welfare payouts.14 A state domi-
nated by a pro-welfare political party is also more likely to feature
generous welfare policies,75 as predicted by vote-seeking theories.
Support for race to the bottom theories is weaker. Such theories
do not explain the variation in state benefits, since they predict
that payouts will converge, which has not happened. Such theories
also predict how states will react to increased welfare pressure, in
the form of increased caseloads or welfare-motivated migration.
Faced with increased demand for welfare, particularly from recent
arrivals from out-of-state, states will cut payouts. This prediction
has been tested, but the leading study, Paul Peterson and Mark
Rom's Welfare Magnets,76 suffers from a serious design problem.
The Peterson-Rom model relies on changes in poverty levels as a
proxy for welfare-induced migration. This is unsatisfactory, since
most of those on the poverty rolls are natives, and an increased
poverty level would seem less likely to signal welfare migration
than to signal job losses by natives and a depressed economy. A
negative poverty coefficient is thus unsurprising, since poorer
states will find it harder to fund generous welfare programs.
7 7
recipients must be discounted because they are less likely to vote than other citi-
zens. However, it would be wrong to suppose that only welfare recipients care about
welfare. Other parties with a stake in promoting high welfare levels include (1)
those who expect to rely on it in the future, (2) those who might have to support the
recipient if her welfare payments were cut, and (3) welfare bureaucrats who admin-
ister the system.
' Robert D. Brown, Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the American States,
89 Am Pol Sc Rev 23 (1995) ("Brown, Party Cleavages"); Jack Tweedie, Resources
Rather Than Needs: A State-Centered Model of Welfare Policymaking, 38 Am J Pol
Sc 651 (1994) ("Tweedie, Resources Rather Than Needs"); Richard D. Plotnick and
Richard F. Winters, Party, Political Liberalism, and Redistribution, 18 Am Politics
Q 430 (1990); Richard D. Plotnick and Richard F. Winters, A Politico-Economic The-
ory of Redistribution, 79 Am Pol Sc Rev 458 (1985).
7s Brown, Party Cleavages (cited in note 74); Tweedie, Resources Rather Than
Needs (cited in note 74); Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Competition, Constituencies, and
Welfare Policies in American States, 73 Am Pol Sc Rev 414 (1979).
76 Peterson & Rom, Welfare Magnets (cited in note 7)
17 In addition, poverty rates might vary in ways that have nothing to do with
deadbeat migration or job losses by natives. For example, the rise in illegitimacy and
divorce rates since 1970 has swelled poverty rolls. These changes are in part attrib-
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Other econometric studies of benefit levels have failed to detect
a significant poverty predictor. Dye found that a poverty predictor
of total welfare payouts was negative and insignificant, while an
income predictor was positive and significant."8 From this, he con-
cluded that wealthy states spent more on welfare than poor ones.
In a more recent book, Peterson reported similar findings.79 A
poverty rate predictor of per capita redistributive spending was pos-
itive and insignificant, while a variable based on state taxable
resources was positive and significant.
C. Our Model and Variables
The following discussion reports on a test of the determinants of
welfare payouts, in which AFDC payouts were regressed on socio-
economic variables, including a measure of welfare pressure, over
the twelve-year period from 1980 to 1991. The equations we used
to estimate benefits levels were of the form:
(A) In AFDCt = o + 0I in CASEit.1 + (2 In POLITICSi1, + 033 In
AGENCYit. + 04 In BLACKi,.1 + s In
UNEMft.l + P6 In CONit-1 + 37 In POVit.1 + 08
In AFDCit.1 + ei
(B) in AFDCi = 030 + 1 In MIGi. 1 + (2 in POLITICSi,.1 + (3 In
AGENCYi. 1 + N3 In BLACKit.1 + P5 In
UNEMit.1 + (6 In CONit-1 + 07 In POVit.1 + 08
In AFDCit.I + ei
where the variables are defined as provided in Table I, and where
utable to relaxed social norms, see Brinig & Buckley, Price of Virtue (cited in note
27), and to the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, see Brinig & Buckley, No-Fault
Laws (cited in note 30). Poverty rates are also an imprecise measure of economic
need. The poverty rate ignores accumulated wealth, and looks only at reported cash
income. Butler & Kondratas, Out of the Poverty 7Yap at 42-48 (cited in note 6). As
such, it overestimates poverty amongst the elderly, whose share of the population
increased from 9.1% to 12.3% in Arizona and from 14.6% to 17.6% in Florida dur-
ing the period of the Peterson-Rom study. Official poverty rates also ignore expected
future earnings, and overstate poverty in states such as Utah where a relatively large
percent of the population is under 21. Finally, Consumer Price Index adjustments
for inflation likely overstate poverty rates in later relative to earlier years. The goods
in the CPI basket have not changed over time, although consumers would presum-
ably react to inflation by substituting cheaper for dearer goods.
78 Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments 55
at Table 2-6 (Lexington Books, 1990). The dependent variable was per capita spend-
ing on welfare.
79 Peterson, Price of Federalism at 105, Table 4-2 (cited in note 45). A more
recent study reported a significant negative poverty coefficient. Paul E. Peterson,
Mark C. Rom and Kenneth F Scheve, State Welfare Policy: A Race to the Bottom
(unpub manuscript 1995).
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In = natural logarithm
P0 ... P8 = regression coefficients
e = residual
i = index for states (50 for equation 1, 48 for equation 2)
t = 1, 2, ..., 12 index for each year from 1980-1991
We employed a log-log model after determining, through a Box-
Cox estimation of the untransformed data, that it was appropriate to
do so.
8 0
Our reliance on time series, cross-sectional (TSCS) data height-
ens concerns about idiosyncratic state factors not captured by the
other variables. The payout decision across states may be influ-
enced by a variety of political, social and economic factors not cap-
Table 1. Definition of Variables
Variable Name Description
AFDC, Average monthly payment per family of four under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program, adjusted for
inflation
CASEt-, Change in AFDC recipients from one year to the next,
divided by population under age 65
MIGt- 1  Population (Year 2) + Deaths (Year 2) - Births (Year 2) -
International Immigrants (Year 2) - Population (Year 1),
divided by Population (Year 1)
POLITICSt_1  Nonsouth Dummy*Percent Democrats in the State Lower
House, where Nonsouth means a state not in the Confeder-
acy
AGENCYtI Number of state welfare employees divided by state popula-
tion
BLACKt-I Percent Black population* 100
UNEMt_1  Average of monthly unemployment figures* 100
CONt_1  Total dollar value of commercial and residential contracts for
projects completed in the year, adjusted for inflation, and
divided by adult population* 1000
POVt-i Percent of state population living below federal standards for
meeting basic needs* 100
Sources: Immigration data, Immigration and Naturalization Service; all other data,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years).
so The Box-Cox Xs varied from 0.11 (CASE) to 0.14 (MIG). Box-Cox transforma-
tions are discussed in George G. Judge, et al, Introduction to the Theory and Prac-
tice of Econometrics 555-56 (Wiley, 2d ed 1987).
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Table H. Summary Statistics
Variable Name Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
AFDCt 288.29 106.44 90.44 691.0
CASE,-1  1.0503 0.14532 0.65133 1.8667
MIGt_1  0.89078 2.2848 -7.0137 11.931
POLMCS,_1  0.42403 0.26602 0 0.88653
AGENCYtI 1.1035 0.69048 0.093012 4.7161
BLACK,-, 9.2956 9.2355 0.1957 35.614
UNEMt_1  6.7937 2.3251 1.70 18.0
CON,-1  1.278 0.67856 0.34318 6.3852
POVt-1  13.648 4.3422 2.90 29.0
tured by our model. This will also be true of the CASE and MIG
variables, which are jointly estimated in a Two Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) procedure. Because of this, we employed a fixed-effects (FE)
model in the first two specifications of Tables IH and IV, with a sep-
arate intercept for each state.8 1 Specifications 3 and 4 of both
Tables were estimated in a cross-section (CS) model, without fixed
state effects.
Our dependent variable, serving as a proxy for state welfare
payouts, is AFDC, the average monthly AFDC payment to a fam-
ily of four, adjusted for inflation. The centrality of AFDC in the
American welfare system has already been noted.82 In addition,
AFDC is a better proxy for a state's commitment to wealth
transfer programs than programs like Food Stamps which are
financed solely by the federal government.8 3 AFDC payouts are
also more easily measured than other state-financed poverty pro-
grams, such as Housing Allowances. Moreover, AFDC payouts
always reach their recipients, unlike state welfare budgets, which
must also support welfare bureaucracies. Finally, the AFDC pro-
gram is the most direct subsidy of illegitimacy, which is gener-
81 On the need to employ a fixed state effect model for TSCS data, see Gary S.
Becker, Comments on Danzon, Mai, Murray, and Allen, 11 J Labor Econ S326
(1993).
82 Butler & Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap 138 (cited in note 6).
83 Aggregating AFDC and food stamps benefits, as Peterson and Rom do, would
nevertheless make sense if states treated the two programs as perfect substitutes,
cutting AFDC benefits on an increase in food stamp payouts. Whether this has hap-
pened is unclear, though there is some evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Robert Moffitt, Has State Redistribution Policy Grown More Conservative?, 43 Nat
Tax J 123 (1990).
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ally taken to be one of America's most serious social patholo-
gies.
84
On race to the bottom theories, increased welfare pressure, or
recipient demand for welfare services, leads to cuts in welfare
spending. Our model employs two welfare pressure predictors. The
first is CASE, the change in the number of per capita AFDC recip-
ients from one year to the next. To arrive at the per capita figure for
Year 2, we divided the difference between the number of recipients
in Year 2 less the number of recipients in Year 1 by the under-65
population of the state in Year 1.85
We also employed a second welfare pressure predictor, MIG, rep-
resenting net migration flows. The CASE predictor does not distin-
guish between native and migrant reliance on welfare. The distinc-
tion is important on race to the bottom theories, which assume
that a state is less willing to support new arrivals than established
natives. We therefore employed MIG to measure changes in state
population based on net migration flows. MIG is our estimate of
the per cent change in state population which is not attributable to
native births and deaths or to international immigration. To arrive
at our MIG figure for Year 2, we added the Year 2 state population
plus deaths less births less international immigrants 86 less the Year
1 state population, and divided the sum by Year 1 state population.
MIG2 = (POP2 + DEATHS2 - BIRTHS2 - IMMIG2 - POP1)/POP1
For example, suppose that state population was 100 in Year 1 and
110 in Year 2. If there were 2 deaths, 5 births, and 1 international
migrant in that year, then 60% of the population increase was
attributable to net national migration flows. This figure represent
net in-migration from other states less out-migration by natives.8 7
The MIG variable does not distinguish between welfare-moti-
vated and other migrants. It is therefore a more muted proxy of
84 Brinig & Buckley, Price of Virtue (cited in note 27); Popenoe, Life Without
Father (cited in note 28).
85 The elderly are unlikely to be AFDC recipients.
86 In calculating international immigration flows, data problems prevented us
from including those who were normalized between 1989-1991 under the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA), after having entered the country illegally years
before. IRCA immigrants were legalized to the state of their then-residence between
1989-1992, and vastly increased total immigration flows over that period. Before
they were legalized, IRCA admittants did not qualify for AFDC. Nevertheless, they
were considered a major welfare burden in the states in which they settled, such as
California, where the electorate attempted to respond by limiting benefits through
Proposition 187. The constitutionality of Proposition 187 is now before the courts.
" To the extent that subsequent births to migrants are counted as native births,
this understates the effects of migration.
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welfare pressure than CASE. However, domestic and international
migration flows are significantly correlated with differential wel-
fare payouts, 88 and state officials have frequently expressed the fear
that migration increases the welfare burden.
On vote-seeking theories, we would expect higher welfare pay-
outs in states dominated by a pro-welfare political party. Unsur-
prisingly, state welfare effort has been found to be significantly cor-
related with Democratic party control at the state level.89 Our
POLITICS variable therefore represents the percentage of the state
lower house that is Democratic times a dummy variable taking the
value of 0 for southern states and 1 otherwise.90 We excluded
southern states because their legislatures were overwhelmingly
Democratic during the period of our study, and manifestly did not
cater to welfare constituencies.
We would expect a higher AFDC payout in states where the wel-
fare bureaucracy is stronger. As William Niskanen has noted,
bureaucrats seek to maximize the size of their budget allocations.
9 1
Our proxy for the interest group clout of welfare bureaucrats is
AGENCY, the number of welfare employees per capita.
We expected that welfare payouts would be smaller in states
with a higher per cent BLACK population, as AFDC payouts are
relatively low in the Southern states.
Finally, one would expect to find higher welfare payouts in more
prosperous states, and therefore employed three economic predic-
tors.92 UNEM is the average monthly unemployment. CON is the
dollar value (adjusted for inflation) of completed commercial and
residential construction contracts for new structures and additions,
divided by the adult population. POV is the per cent of the popula-
tion below the federal poverty line.
88 Brinig & Buckley, Deadbeats (cited in note 40); Buckley, Immigration Policies
(cited in note 39).
89 Brown, Party Cleavages, 89 Am Pol Se Rev 23 (cited in note 74).
9' For Nebraska, we used the percentage of Democrats in its unicameral
House.
91 William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government
(Aldine-Atherton, 1971).
92 States with a higher standard of living would be expected to have higher wel-
fare payouts. However, we did not have a reliable state cost-of-living deflator. For
example, the Chamber of Commerce cost-of living figures are not particularly help-
ful. Inter-City Cost of Living Index (American Chamber of Commerce Researchers
Association, various years). The Chamber of Commerce data reflect price differ-
ences for expensive items such as houses and T-Bone steaks, which welfare recipi-
ents are unlikely to purchase. We would expect much smaller variation for the pre-
packaged staples that form the basis of low income diets.
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D. Endogeneity
We hypothesize that AFDC values are affected by CASE and MIG,
as states react to additional welfare pressures. But causation may
work in the other direction as well, with AFDC increases resulting
in greater welfare caseloads and higher migration flows. An
increase in benefits levels will increase the demand for welfare, and
this will swell the welfare roll. Some families that were previously
ineligible for AFDC will find that they now qualify. Other families
that formerly were deterred by the stigma of welfare will now find
it worthwhile to seek AFDC assistance. The direction of causation
might then be reversed: instead of observing state officials respond-
ing to CASE and MIG changes, we might be observing CASE and
MIG changes in response to changes in payouts.
We addressed this problem in three ways. First, we lagged all
independent variables, including CASE and MIG, by a year. That is,
we estimated how states reacted to Year 1 CASE and MIG changes
in their Year 2 payout decision. This reduces concerns about the
direction of causation, insofar as causes precede consequences.
Second, we employed a Koyck distributed lag model, in which a
lagged dependent variable is added as a predictor. Even if indepen-
dent variables are lagged, the causation problem remains if AFDC
recipients make their welfare application decision in Year 1 in the
expectation of what the Year 2 payout will be. Possibly this places
too much faith in recipient prescience. Since states may react to an
increased caseload through an immediate cut in welfare benefits,
the recipient may not be able to form a judgment about future pay-
outs. But in some cases he might. Because of this, in specifications
1 and 3 of Tables I and IV we employed an adaptive expectations
model, in which recipients use past history to predict future pay-
outs, with geometrically declining weights. This is equivalent to
the Koyck distributed lag model.9 3
Third, we employed a 2SLS estimation technique, in which the
AFDC and welfare pressure variables are jointly estimated. In Table
I, we employed four instrumental variables to predict AFDC and
CASE: Metro, Emgro, Income, and South. Metro is the percentage
of the population living in a standard metropolitan statistical area.
Emgro is the per cent change in non-agricultural employment from
the prior year. Income represents the mean income per adult. South
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the state was a mem-
ber of the Confederacy, and 0 otherwise. In Table IV, estimating
AFDC and MIG, we dropped the South instrumental variable, but
added three new instrumental variables: Temperature, Tax and
Elder. Temperature is the average January high temperature from
93 Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics 513-15 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1988).
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Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Number of observations = 600.
All variables have been transformed into their natural logs except for dummy vari-
ables.
significantly different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test).
* significantly different from zero at the .10 level (two-tailed test).
1961 to 1990 in the largest city of each state. Tax represents total
state and municipal tax receipts from all sources excluding federal
transfer payments, divided by the adult population. 4 Elder is the
percentage of the population that is more than 65 years old.
94 Government Finances in 1985-86 (Bureau of the Census, 1987).
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Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Number of observations = 576.
All variables have been trans formed into their natural logs except for dummy vari-
ables.
** significantly different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test).
* significantly different from zero at the .10 level (two-tailed test).
E. Results
Our results are given in Tables HI and IV, with additional sensitivity
tests reported in Table V. Our 2SLS equations in Table m jointly esti-
mate AFDC and CASE, with AFDC and MIG jointly estimated in
Table IV.
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Our principal finding is that our welfare pressure coefficients,
CASE and MIG, are significant and positive in most specifications.
CASE is significant and positive throughout in Table I, while MIG
is significant and positive in the FE specifications in Table IV.
Because our results in FE specifications 1 and 2 of Table IV dif-
fered from CS specifications 3 and 4, we performed a Hausman test
for omitted variables, and were able to reject the null hypothesis
that fixed state effects are independent of the explanatory variables
in the CS specifications.
Table V presents results of sensitivity tests. Specifications 1 to 4
employ a FE model, and specifications 5 to 8 a CS model, with both
OLS and Kmenta pooling regression procedures. 95 Since our welfare
pressure coefficients are uniformly positive and significant, we infer
that our 2SLS estimation technique is not responsible for our find-
ings.
These results are inconsistent with race to the bottom explana-
tions of the welfare spending decision. However, they are consis-
tent with vote-seeking theories, as are our findings of a generally
positive POLITICS coefficient.
By contrast, our results do not support the theory that
entrenched welfare bureaucracies shape welfare payouts. Our
AGENCY coefficient was frequently negative, and seldom positive
and significant.
Our BLACK coefficient was generally negative and significant in
Table III. This result is unsurprising, given the low payouts in
southern states with a high percentage of black residents, and
might be attributed to economic and political stratifications along
racial lines, or simply to reduced state revenues in such states. In
general, the economic variables also had the expected sign, with
higher payouts in more prosperous states.
In part, our MIG variable might have served as a proxy for pros-
perity, with migrants attracted to boom states. However, the CASE
variable might as plausibly serve as a proxy for economic decline.
With reduced economic opportunities, more people are on the dole.
We would then have expected the CASE coefficient to be negative.
As it was positive and significant, we discounted this explanation
of our results in Table III.
95 The Kmenta cross-sectionally heteroskedastistic and timewise autocorrelated
(CHTA) model is described in Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics 618-22
(MacMillan, 2d ed 1986). The CHTA model corrects for serial correlation through a
state-specific generalized least squares technique. First, the equation is estimated by
OLS. Next, the OLS residuals are used to estimate a separate coefficient of autocor-
relation pi (bounded by-1 and +1) for each state,. The p9's are then used to transform
the observations to produce a serially independent and homoskedastistic error term.
Yit - piXitp + Elt
Finally, the equation is estimated by the OLS method.
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VI. CONCLUSION
If welfare responsibilities had to be assigned exclusively to either
the federal or state levels of government, a strong case might be
made for complete devolution. As noted in Part IlI, state control
over welfare promotes diversity, choice and experimentation. It
also economizes on information production and reduces the power
of entrenched welfare interest groups. But that is a false choice, as
state and federal functions need not be separated by "watertight
compartments."96 Where the federal government subsidizes state
welfare programs, it has a legitimate interest in preventing states
from exporting costs to other states by overspending. Without fed-
eral oversight, states might overspend by failing to consider the
social costs they export to other states. In the case of AFDC, these
social costs include the social pathologies associated with illegiti-
macy.
This reasonably argues for the new direction in welfare policy
signaled by the recently enacted Personal Responsibility Act.97 The
PRA turns over substantially more responsibility for the design of
welfare standards to the states. It also addresses concerns about
excessive welfare spending through curbs on lax eligibility stan-
dards and through block grant financing.
This suggests an asymmetric need for federal oversight, with fed-
erally-mandated ceilings but not floors. The most persuasive argu-
ment for federally-mandated minimum payouts is the race to the
bottom theory, under which states have an incentive to cut bene-
fits to avoid becoming welfare magnets for migrants from out-of-
state. However, we found little evidence of a race to the bottom in
AFDC payouts. Instead, states were found to react to welfare pres-
sure by increasing AFDC benefits, possibly to attract welfare
migrants for their votes.
Even if some states might cut their payouts to avoid becoming
welfare magnets, race for the bottom fears might be addressed less
intrusively by residency requirements than by national welfare
policies. It is disingenuous to claim that devolution will result in a
competition to cut benefits, and then to deny states the power to
cure the problem through reasonable residency standards. A denial
of all welfare benefits to new arrivals, like the Connecticut plan
struck down in Shapiro,98 might deter migrants who are moving to
96 The phrase is Lord Atkin's. Attorney-General of Canada v Attorney-General
of Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 354 (P.C.)
9 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PL
104-193, 110 Stat 2105.
" Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 (1969).
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another job in the new state. But a two-tier plan that offers the
migrant the same payout he received in his emigration state, such
as the California plan at issue in Green v Anderson,99 reasonably
reduces welfare incentives to migration, and should be encouraged.
Our study suggests that giving states the right to impose resi-
dency requirements would not have a substantial effect on payouts.
States that seek to attract welfare migrants will not offer them a
discounted payout. But this is not an argument against granting
states such powers, since some states will clearly use them. The
more interesting question is whether the federal government
should mandate a two-tier system, requiring high payout states to
adopt two-tier residency requirements. Such states would then be
less likely to overspend on welfare to attract welfare voters. A fed-
eral mandate might also result in increased welfare payouts in
states that set payouts at an artificially low level to promote out-
migration by welfare migrants.
The PRA is rationally related and reasonably tailored to the goal
of promoting the experimentation needed to reform a flawed wel-
fare system. The PRA's barriers to excessive state payouts reason-
ably respond to an incentive problem, and the two-tier plans the
statute contemplates do not impose an excessive burden on
migrants. While some have argued that state experimentation
might be chilled by the fear of welfare migration, we found no evi-
dence of this. Because some states might well set benefits with
welfare migrants in mind, however, we conclude that two-tier
plans should be permitted, and perhaps even mandated.
99 115 S Ct 1059 (1995).

